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I. THE IMPACT OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING ON THE 
BUSINESS/ECONOMIC EVIRONMENT 
Under good economic conditions, but particularly during recessionary 
periods, there is usually intense competition between states to attract new 
businesses. New businesses improve local and state economies by provid-
ing an influx of investment dollars, jobs, and new tax. revenues. As states 
and municipalities attempted to boost economic growth during the reces-
sionary U.S. economy of 1991-1992, the legalized gambling organizations 
in Nevada and in Atlantic City, New Jersey, saw the perfect opportunity to 
expand their organizations into previously unexploited regions. 1 
Notwithstanding contrary positions argued by legalized gambling in-
terests in their efforts to gain and exploit new population bases,2 and with 
rare exceptions, legalized gambling activities do not generate long-term or 
even mid-term strategic economic development or tax. revenues.3 Any 
profit generated by legalized gambling almost invariably comes from some 
consumer's pre-existing funds, and the resources devoted to gambling are 
taken from other activities.4 In fact, legalized gambling interests have both 
promoted and discouraged legalized gambling when necessary to further 
their objectives. In one instance, major legalized gambling organizations 
* Professor, University of Illinois; A.B. 1972, William & Mary; J.D. 1976, MBA 1977, Uni-
versity of Georgia; LL.M. 1978, sm, University of Virginia. 
I See BBTI'ER GoVERNMENT AsSOCIATION, STAFF WIDTE PAPER: CASINO GAMBLING IN CHI-
CAGO, apps. P, Q, & R (1992) [hereinafter BETI'ER GoV'T AsS'N REPoRT]. Of course, the present 
analysis deals exclusively with "legalized" or "legal" gambling activities and concomitant propositions, 
and all references to "gambling" should be interpreted as discussing legal gambling and not illegal 
gambling activities. 
2 Id. 
See generally ROBERT GooDMAN, LEGALIZED GAMBLING As A STRATEGY FoR EcONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 16-19, 51-56 (Ctr. for Economic Development, U. Mass.-Amherst 1994) [hereinafter 
GooDMAN]. 
Id. at 51-56. 
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conducted public relations campaigns arguing that their casinos would 
create economic development, jobs, and tax revenues in Illinois.s Howev-
er, in order to undercut their competition in California and preserve their 
own gambling operations in Nevada, some of these same organizations 
simultaneously conducted public relations campaigns in California arguing 
just the opposite.6 
Throughout the 1980s the legalized gambling organizations in Atlantic 
City and Nevada, in particular, felt competitive pressure from the nation-
wide proliferation of state lotteries.7 For example, in 1986 the legalized 
gambling interests in Nevada, and even Nevada state officials, opposed the 
initiation of a state lottery in California.8 If the Nevada legalized gam-
bling interests were concerned with the proximate competition of a Cali-
fornia state lottery, they were more concerned with the potential "devastat-
ing impact" of a 1992 proposal for a moderately-sized casino operation in 
Adelanto, San Bernardino County, California.9 Not only would the 
Adelanto casino "initiative" further saturate the legalized gambling market, 
but more importantly, it would also intercept the local population traveling 
from Southern California to Las VegaslO and open the door to more di-
rect competition from casinos on Indian reservations throughout Califor-
nia. 
The legalized gambling interests in Nevada were also concerned in 
general with future market saturation within the state. From years of mar-
keting experience, the legalized gambling organizations were well aware 
that legalized gambling draws dollars from nearby local and state econo-
mies. l1 Therefore, the legalized gambling interests needed to expand their 
marketing bases to continue to attract consumer dollars. If the expansion 
process was forestalled for very long, the guaranteed population of legal-
BETI'ER GoV'T AsS'N RBPORT. supra note I, at apps. P & Q. 
1d. at app. R. 
See generally CHARLES T. CLOTI'ELTBR AND PHILIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPB 41-48 (1989) 
[hereinafter CLOTI'ELTBR]. 
8 1d. at 130. 
BETI'ER GoV'T AsS'N RBPORT, supra note I, at app. R. 
10 See id. 
II See, e.g., CALIFORNIA GoVERNOR'S OFFICE OP PLANNING AND REsEARCH, CAllFORNIA 
AND NBVADA: SUBSIDY, MONOPOLY, AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OP LEGALIZED GAMBLING ES-l 
(December 1992) ("Gambling by Californians pumps nearly $3.8 billion per year into Nevada, and 
probably adds about $8.8 billion - and 196,000 jobs - to the Nevada economy, counting the second-
Ir)-f.employment it generates .... This is a direct transfer of income and wealth from California to 
Nevada each year.") [hereinafter SUBSIDY]. 
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ized gambling "consumers" (10 percent "problem economic gamblers,"12 
which included 1.5 to 5 percent "compulsive gamblers"13) would be ex-
hausted 14 and profits from those economies in which the legalized gam-
bling organizations were located would diminish or evaporate. IS 
While the proliferation of state lotteries during the 1980s16 jeopar-
dized the regular tourist base attracted by legalized gambling, the major 
threat to the legalized gambling organizations was the long-term saturation 
of the market itself. Yet even while the expansion of state lotteries threat-
ened the Nevada and Atlantic City legalized gambling interests, it also 
unexpectedly provided those interests with their strategic solution. The 
public's acceptance of state lotteriesl7 had softened the image of legalized 
gambling and was laying the groundwork for the national acceptance of 
the "harder" forms of legalized gambling - that is, those forms with 
more of a "thrill factor."18 This trend was further intensified by millions 
of dollars in advertising by state lotteriesl9 aimed at softening concerns 
12 See CLoTFELTER, supra note 7, at 92-94 (approximately ten percent of the public gambles 
sixty-five percent or more of the gambling dollar). From a business-economic perspective, ''problem 
economic gamblers" consist of gamblers who are in the process of becoming problem or probable 
compulsive gamblers, or who are already compulsive gamblers. 
13 Id. at 124-25. See also VALERIE C. LoRENZ, AN OVERVIEW OF PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING 
2-4 (booklet of the National Center for Pathological Gambling) (1990). 
Sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists generally delimit "compulsive" or ''pathological 
gamblers" pursuant to the South Oaks Gambling Screen. See Henry R. Lesieur and Sheila B. Blume, 
The South Oaks Gambling Screen: A New Instrument For The Identification Of Pathological Gam-
blers, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1184 (1987). From a business-economic perspective, "compulsive eco-
nomic gamblers" are synonymous with the sociological defmition of compulsive or pathological gam-
blers. 
14 See generally MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, ALcOHOL 
AND DRUG ABUSE ADMINISTRATION, TASK FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDIcnON IN MARYLAND 
(Valerie C. Lorenz and Robert M. Politzer, co-chairs, 1990) [hereinafter MARYLAND REPoRT]. 
15 Indeed, Nevada and Atlantic City thrived thanks to the massive numbers of tourists attract-
ed to these gambling meccas which exercised a practical monopoly on the more thrilling, or ''harder,'' 
forms of legalized gambling in the United States. 
16 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 144-51. 
17 See, e.g., id. at 151-58. Of course, the lottery issue was often the subject of rigorous public 
debate in many states. Id. 
18 For a discussion of this "thrill factor" or "sensation seeking in gamblers" and a review of 
the relevant literature, see Kenny Coventry and R. lain Brown, Sensation Seeking In Gamblers And 
Non-Gamblers And Its Relation To Preference For Gambling Activities. Chasing Arousal And Loss Of 
Control In Regular Gamblers, in GAMBLING BEHAVIOR AND PROBLEM GAMBLING 25 (1993). 
19 Approximately 3.2 to 3.6 cents of each dollar spent on state lotteries is utilized for prizes, 
advertising and promotional activities. CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 26-27. 199-202. More advertising 
expenses are spent in the lottery industry (2 to 2.2 percent) than in any other industry except amuse-
ment and recreation (3 percent). Id. at 200. Lottery states spend approximately $300 million per year 
I· 
!. 
I': 
.I: 
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about legalized gambling activities and promulgating the widespread ac-
ceptance of games of chance. 
lllinois serves as an example of an early state to develop legalized 
gambling activities. In lllinois, the state lottery was initiated in 1974;20 a 
variety of lottery "games" proliferated throughout the 1980s;21 major ex-
pansions in the numbers of off-track betting parlors occurred in 1990 and 
1991;22 riverboat gambling was legalized in 1990 and initiated in 
1991;23 video-machine gambling was also proposed in 1991-1992;24 and 
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley proposed a $2 billion land-based casino 
complex in 1992.25 Furthermore, by 1992 over 50 bills regarding legal-
ized gambling activities were pending in the lllinois state legislature.26 
South Dakota serves as an example of an even more rapidly-develop-
ing gambling state. Until the initiation of its state lottery in 1987, there 
was no legalized gambling per se in South Dakota.27 However, beginning 
November 1, 1989, the city of Deadwood, South Dakota, initiated land-
based casino gambling after a state-wide plebiscite; casino gambling on 
the Indian reservations was in full operation by 1990; and by 1991, video-
machine gambling was available throughout the state.28 
on advertising. GooDMAN, supra note 3, at 14. 
» CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 5. 
21 Id. at 6. 
Z2 See 1LuN00S EcoNOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION, WAGERING IN ILUNOIS 26-28 (1992). 
Id. at 51-53 (Act approved February 7, 1990; operations began September 8, 1991, in 
Alton, Dl.). 
'23 
:M Dlinois State Representative E. J. Giorgi repeatedly supported video-slotslvideo-machine 
gambling during 1991-1992. See, e.g., Chuck Sweeny, Giorgi, Bishop Clash Over Gambling, REGIS-
TBR STAR (Rockford, Dl.), December 12, 1991, at 1. 
25 Edward Walsh, Chicago May Gamble On Casino Proposal, WASH. PoST, May 24, 1992, 
§ A, at 3 [hereinafter Walsh]. 
For an example of how the process of legalizing gambling gains a momentum of its own, 
see Jack R. Van Der Slik, Legalked Gambling: Predatory Policy, Iu.. IsSUES, March 1990, at 30. 
%I CLOTFELTER, supl'fl note 7, at 146. The state lottery was approved in 1986 and began oper-
ating in 1987. 
ZI Legalized video-machine gambling had begun on October I, 1989. A vote to repeal the vid-
eo-machine gambling was defeated by 62.8 percent to 37.2 percent on November 3, 1992. I. Nelson 
Rose, Gambling And The Law: 1992 Elections, Endless Field Of Dreams 1 (1992) (unpublished arti-
cle, on file with author). 
A massive public relations campaign by the legalized gambling interests misdirected the voters 
into believing that repealing video-machine gambling would reduce the number of tax dollars going to 
education. For examples of how the public has been misled by arguments that legalized gambling will 
assist education, see BB1TI!R GoV'T AsS'N REPORT, supra note I, at app. Q; CLOTFELTER, supra 
note 7, at lSI-53. See also Daley Seeks Teachers' Support For Casino, NBWS-GAZBTI'B (Champaign, 
Dl.), March 29, 1992, § B, at 8 (Mayor Daley of Chicago seeking the support of the Dlinois Federation 
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Within two years of initiating these casinos and state-wide video lot-
tery terminals (VLTs), an interesting business phenomenon was observed 
in South Dakota: a number of personal and business bankruptcies were 
being caused by gambling debts.29 
''There'd be significantly fewer bankruptcies without the gam-
bling aspects," said Peder Ecker, a federal bankruptcy judge in 
Sioux Falls. ''There's definitely a pattern of increasing bankruptcy 
filings because of the gambling." 
Ecker said he attributed most of the bankruptcies related to 
gambling to the state's video lottery, saying he saw no cases that 
involved gambling debts before the game started in October 1989. 
Gambling has grown to rival uninsured medical costs as a leading 
cause of bankruptcies, he said.30 
These bankruptcies and the concomitant losses in jobs were a direct result 
of legalized gambling, and would not have occurred had VLT gambling, 
casino gambling, and even the "softer" gambling of the state lottery not 
been legalized.31 
Clinical observations appear to confirm this phenomenon. The law 
firm handling most of the bankruptcy cases in South Dakota confirmed 
that while the overall number of filings were down, gambling was an in-
creasing cause of bankruptcies in South Dakota.32 Similarly, a 1992 'Min-
of Teachers for a casino complex in Chicago). 
Z9 See, e.g., Todd Nelson, S.D. Bankruptcies Down 5 Percent, Judge: Gambling Caused Most 
Cases, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls, S.D.), January 15, 1993, at I [hereinafter S.D. Bankruptcies]. Not 
surprisingly, this phenomenon had been predicted. See, e.g., 10Dean Joy, Address before the South 
Dakota Citizens Forum on Video-Lottery Terminals, Sioux Falls, S.D. (October 18, 1992) (a national-
ly-recognized critic of legalized gambling activities) . 
30 S.D. Bankruptcies, supra note 29, at I (emphasis added). 
31 It should be noted that the legalization of gambling activities increases the number of com-
pulsive gamblers from .77 percent of the population to 1.5 to 5 percent. See notes 12-14, supra, and 
accompanying text. 
32 S.D. BanJcruptcies, supra note 29, at I. According to one bankruptcy attorney, this phenom-
enon was puzzling: 
"I can't put my finger on why there were fewer filings," Blake said. 
"I consulted with a lot of people about bankruptcy that apparently didn't follow 
through .... It always mystified me when somebody comes in with $40,000 of debt and 
you don't see them again." 
Blake agreed that gambling is an increasing cause of bankruptcy. 
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nesota report also raised the proposition that increased legalized gambling 
activities in the state might be linked to the increase in bankruptcies.33 
In any event, South Dakota and lllinois illustrate that with enough 
public relations dollars promoting legalized gambling activities,34 both 
public officials and voters could be directed toward accepting the argu-
ments that legalized gambling activities are traditional "businesses,"3s and 
would provide net jobs and positive tax revenues on a statewide basis.36 
If these arguments were palatable to the U.S. public during a healthy eco-
nomic climate, then these arguments would be even more acceptable and 
gain impetus during recessionary times.37 That 1992 in particular was a 
time to capitalize on the economic fears of the public was reinforced by 
Bill Clinton's victory over President George Bush - when mounting con-
cern over the U.S. economy was identified as the primary voter issue.38 
The window of opportunity had opened for the legalized gambling organi-
Id. 
"I see people every month who tell me that it was because of video lottery," he said. 
"I see cases where people essentially gamble away $40,000 or $50,000 over a couple of 
years. Sometimes it's $5,000 to $10,000." 
It has been estimated that most compulsive gamblers tend to admit only approximately one-third 
of their actual debt due to gambling. Letter from Ms. Elizabeth George, Executive Director, Minnesota 
Council on Compulsive Gambling (December 21, 1992) (on file with author). In addition, the national 
statistics indicate the average debt of the "bottomed-out" compulsive gambler is conservatively esti-
mated between $75,000 and $80,000. MARYLAND REPoRT, supra note 14, at 60-61. 
33 MINNEsOTA PLANNINO OFFICE, HIOH STAKES: GAMBLINO IN MINNEsOTA 29 (1992). 
34 Sponsors spent $5 million to promote a $2 billion proposal for a casino complex in Chica-
go. Patrick T. Reardon and Rick Pearson, Casino Firms Say Patience Tapped Out, CHI. TRIB., Decem-
ber 4, 1992, § 2, at 1,7. 
See, e.g., ILLINOIS GAMINO BOARD, ANNUAL REPoRT AND WAOERINO STUDY 1991 10-11 
(1992). This governmental study basically accepts in toto the arguments of the riverboat interests and 
ignores the overall welfare of the Illinois public. Id. at 9-11. See BBTI'ER GoV'T ASS'N REPoRT, supra 
note 1, app. Q, at 23-25 (internal public relations report "leaked" to the public, delimiting "'The Mob' 
As Businessmen"). 
36 See generally, BBTI'ER GoV'T ASS'N REPoRT, supra note 1, app. Q; GooDMAN, supra 
note 3. 
rI Experts say the current recession causes people to gamble more, not less. As the economy 
sours, studies show, people look for quick solutions to their woes - especially the poor, who are 
hardest hit in bad times. 
"When economic times tum down, there will always be a segment of society that tends to 
try to hit a big score because the legitimate means for upward mobility have been reduced," 
says H. Roy Kaplan, sociologist and author of the 1978 book "Lottery Winners." 
Susan M. Barbieri, 'The Addiction Of The '90s': Compulsive Gambling Comes Into lIS Own In Reces-
,sionary Times, WASH. PosT, November 30, 1992, § D, at 5. 
38 See, e.g., Howard Fineman, The Torch Passes, NEWSWEEK, Novemberl December 1992. 
at 4, 6. 
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zations, and the time had come for them to initiate a strategy of carpe di-
em and expand beyond Nevada and Atlantic City.39 However, even a 
New Jersey Commission generally favorable to legalized gambling activ-
ities cautioned that "New Jersey should never risk weakening its regulato-
ry systems to enhance the State's fiscal condition or offset possible eco-
nomic consequences occasioned by downturns . ... "40 Furthermore, the 
Commission noted it was "clear that retail business and retail employment 
in Atlantic City have continued to decline despite the presence of gam-
bling ... .'041 The economic caveat is that state governments should not 
be prodded by perceived economic vulnerability into hasty and risky de-
velopmental policies - such as legalized gambling - which might even-
tually intensify business-economic problems.42 
Notwithstanding the generally poor economic conditions of 1991-
1992, the timing for the legalized gambling organizations was propitious, 
and their strategy was simple: instead of waiting for tourists to come to 
them, the organizations would go to the tourists by locating in as many 
dense population centers as possible.43 Those establishments successfully 
implementing this strategy would not have to worry about profitability for 
years since the legalized gambling activities would naturally take a major 
portion of the sixty-five percent "market cream" of the local population's 
gambling dollars.44 This phenomenon means that there is a premium for 
being the first, most aggressive, or "most thrilling" form of legalized gam-
bling established in a population center. Hence, it was not surprising that 
there were proposals during 1992 for major land-based casinos in Chicago 
and New Orleans4s - both prime population centers, 
]OJ For specialized discussions of the evolution of legalized gambling activities in Atlantic 
City, New Jersey, see GEORGE STBRNLIBB AND JAMBS W. HUGHES, THE ATLANTIC CITY GAMBLE 
(1983); Hawkins, The Atlantic City Experience: Casino Gambling As An Economic Recovery Program, 
6 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 85 (1982); KIMBERLY J. WARKBR, CASINO GAMBLING AS URBAN REDEVEL-
OPMENT: A CASE STUDY OP THE PoUTICAL EcONOMY OP ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY (1988). 
.. NEW JERSEY GoVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON GAMBLING, REPORT AND REcOM-
MENDATIONS 5 (1988) (emphasis added) • 
., Id. at 16. 
42 GooDMAN, supra note 3, at 16. 
43 See, e.g., BB'ITBR GoV'T AsS'N REPORT, supra note I, apps. p, Q, & R (internal "leaked" 
planning documents of the legalized gambling industry). 
.. See notes 12-14, supra, and accompanying text. As one business source reported: 
"It will be impossible not to make a lot of money," one executive in New Orleans bragged 
before his casino had even opened. "It's like spitting and missing the floor." 
James Popkin and Katia Hetter, America's Gambling Craze, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., March 14, 
1994, at 42, 43. 
See id. The efforts in New Orleans were substantially successful. In the form of a "compro-
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Once proposed gambling activities become legalized, the legalized 
gambling interests are concerned primarily with the quickest and most 
effective way to tap the local economy.46 The fastest drain seems to be 
approximately three to five years before the 1.5 to 5 percent of local com-
pUlsive gamblers will "bottom-out," spending and losing their total as-
set/credit base. Therefore, while tourist campaigns and advertisements may 
be undertaken, legalized gambling organizations would almost invariably 
profit even if they did not attract a single tourist for approximately 
five years.47 
Given the inherent nature of the legalized gambling markets, the first 
five years of business generally constitute the major revenue years for 
most legalized gambling organizations - after which they must find new 
markets and/or new marketing gimmicks to attract gamblers.48 During the 
first five years, the profit margins can be surprisingly large. For example, 
in 1990 the Excalibur in Las Vegas opened as the largest hotel in the 
United States and then stunned the business world by paying its entire 
mortgage out of "operating revenues" in less than 2 years - while the 
rest of the country was in a recession.49 In another scenario, the gambling 
riverboat in Alton, lllinois, sold more than $100 million in stock during its 
first day of trading. so 
mise," Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards signed a bill on June 18, 1992, authorizing but a single 
casino, although the legislation left open the possibility of future additional casinos. Rita Koselka, 
Fantasyland, FORBES, March 1, 1993, at 62 [hereinafter Koselka]. 
The' estimated increased costs of this casino to the New Orleans criminal justice system were es-
timated at $10.4 million per year for police and corrections costs, $2.3 million per year for anorney's 
fees, and $1.5 million for court costs. ILLINOIS STATE PoUCE, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL INvESTIGATION, 
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, How CASINO GAMBUNG AFFEcrs LAw ENFORCEMENT 9 (April 16, 1992) 
[hereinafter ILL. STATE PoUCE]; Terrance W. Gainor, Director of the Illinois State Police, Address 
before AnnuallAODAPCA Luncheon, May 8, 1992, at 9-10 (transcript on file with author). 
46 In Louisiana's case, this concern may have been reflected iii the initial approval of but a 
single casino for New Orleans, because the population base could have sustained more than one . 
• 7 The pre-existing consumer base provides substantial dollars to legalized gambling activities 
upon their initiation - regardless of any inputs by tourists. See, e.g., GooDMAN, supra note 3, at 51-
56. 
41 This factor also explains why gambling organizations are adamant about seeking and get-
ting five-year tax waivers for the fl1St five years of operation. See, e.g., Melissa Merlie. Betting Parlor 
Operator Ties Danville Location To Tax Rebate, NEWS-GAZE'ITE (Champaign. Ill.), August 2, 1990. 
§ A, at 1, 10. 
49 James Coates. Vegas' Tip To Chicago: Casino Is Family Fun. CHI. TRIB .• April 10. 1992. 
at 1. 10. 
so Ray Long. $100 Million In Riverboat Stock Sold. CHI. SUN-TIMES, February 19. 1993. 
at 13. Critics wondered about megaprofits for investors. considering that much of the riverboat stock 
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In any event, legalized gambling organizations cannot be characterized 
as conventional businesses and do not conduct traditional business activi-
ties despite efforts to market themselves as SUCh.51 Unless massive num-
bers of new tourists are attracted by the advent of legalized gambling ac-
tivities, the pre-existing economy and tourist trade are eventually depleted, 
and consequently the legalized gambling will not provide state-wide eco-
nomic growth, jobs, or tax revenues. 52 Legalized gambling interests in-
stead provide only the illusion of relative economic development, for 
where one locale might gain, others surely lose.53 Across the region as a 
whole, there is no gain, but there can be large losses when the 4lcreased 
regulatory costs, crime costs, and social-welfare costs are factored into the 
analysis.54 Economically speaking, legalized gambling is a sucker bet. 
Like the fairy-tale, the economic Emperor of legalized gambling is wear-
ing no clothes. It is a sad reflection upon society, and particularly legisla-
tive offIcials, that so many have ignored the business-economic negatives 
for so long. 
n. LEGALIZED GAMBLING AND THE SHORT-TERM 
ILLUSION OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Any large infusion of money into a local economy can initially stimu-
late short-term economic development, new jobs, and tax revenues. How-
ever, short-term progress does not always indicate long-term growth. For 
this reason it is essential to analyze legalized gambling and its projected 
economic impact for the intermediate-term and long-term. Only then can 
the actual economic effects of legalized gambling be adequately evaluated. 
The legalized gambling interests, however, often focus public attention 
on possible short-term economic benefIts as a technique to misdirect the 
was allegedly purchased for approximately one cent per share by the initial investors and that within 
two years the stock was being sold at between $19.25 and $21.50 per share. No illegality, however, 
was alleged. Floyd Norris, Insiders' Didn't Take Much Of A Gamble With Argosy Gaming, 
N.Y. TIMBS, February 25, 1993, § D, at 10. 
.. Alf Siewers, 2 Reports Reveal Casino Strategy, CHI. SUN-TiMES, August 7, 1992, at 14. See 
also BETI"ER GoV'T ASS'N REPORT, supra note I, apps. P, Q, & R (internal public relations documents 
"leaked" from the offices of legalized gambling interests). 
52 For a specific example of the importance of the tourist factor, see BETI"ER GoV'T ASS'N 
REPORT, supra note I, at 4648. 
>3 See GooDMAN, supra note 3, at 51-56. 
Sf See ILL. STATE PoLICE, supra note 45, at 9. 
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"':C:~0.no)ni(:C1eDlite.55 What they conveniently omit is that the eventual re-
s~lts of legalized gambling are seriously debilitating. According to the 
authoritative nationwide statistics,56 legalized gambling activities eventu-
ally effectuate: 
1. economic dysfunction, 57 
2. the exploitation of minoritiesS8 and low-income groups,S9 
3. social dysfunction,60 and 
4. an eventual increase in taxes to address new social problems 
necessarily generated by legalized gambling.61 
All fonns of legalized gambling have a disproportionate impact on His-
panics62 and Afro-Americans,63 as well as on low-income groups,64 
who spend an average of 2.2 percent of their weekly income on legalized 
gambling.6S These trends result in dramatic increased costs to social pro-
grams, increased unemployment for minorities, and more proportional 
unemployment for minorities than for whites.66 
Since legalized gambling leaves the local community and state with 
increased social-welfare costs, inordinate pressures are placed on govern-
ment officials to raise real estate taxes, state income taxes, and business 
" For a review of fourteen studies analyzing the costs and benefits of various legalized gam-
bling proposals, see GooDMAN, supra note 3. Only one of these studies was considered ''balanced,'' 
and most were criticized for "hiding the costs." Id. at 16. 
" See CLoTFELTER, supra note 7, at 96-104. 
51 Id. at 99. 
5. Id. at 96, 98-100. 
59 Id. at 96-98. See also 138 CONGo REc. S187 (daily ed. January 22, 1992) (statement of Sen. 
Simon) ("If you go into the poorest section of Chicago or East St. Louis, you will see people lined up 
to buy lottery tickets .... [W]e have to find way[s] of raising revenue that do not impose on the 
weakest and poorest in our society." (emphasis added». 
60 See CLoTPBLTER, supra note 7, at 104-06. 
61 [d. at 99, 132-35. 
62 Id. at 96. 
63 Id. at 98. 
64 Id. at 98-100. "[T]he prospect of households earning less than $10,000 per year averaging 
$550 per year on gambling, for example, as studies have shown for lotteries, is sickening to contem-
plate." Earl L. Grinols, Analysis Of The Major Impacts Of Off-Track Gambling In Champaign, Dlinois 
(September 23, 1991) (unpublished report, on file with author), citing CLoTFELTER, supra note 7, 
at 99. 
See CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 99-100. 
66 See, e.g., BElTER GoV'T AsS'N REPORT, supra note I, at 64-68. See also id. at 56-69, 
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taxes.67 The promises of sustained economic growth promulgated by the 
legalized gambling organizations constitute, at best, illusory promises. As 
a result, the public contract between the legalized gambling organizations 
and the state to assist the economy constitutes a nudum pactum, or void 
agreement. 
m. THE EFFORTS OF COMMUNITIES TO ATTRACT NEW 
BUSINESSES 
Businesses seek to locate in those local and state economies which 
have or can provide a stimulating business/economic environment. 68 Eco-
nomically depressed areas often look beyond traditional manufacturing 
jobs to bolster their economies, and legalized gambling activities may be 
considered.69 However, an actual accounting of the societal cost-benefit 
analysis is necessary to determine whether the activity, such as legalized 
gambling, would produce the desired economic growth and should there-
fore be introduced into the region.70 The results of some economic stud-
ies71 should "give pause to policymakers who are considering the use of 
casinos as a machine for growth in depressed regions."n 
"Stability of expectations,,73 is an essential ingredient of an attractive 
business environment. Businesses need to know that if they perform in a 
certain manner, they can minimize risk and maximize their expectations. 
While risk is always a factor in a changing business environment, the in-
ability to calculate that risk is almost more destabilizing than the magni-
tude of any calculated risk. 
One basic example of stability of expectations involves what is termed 
"the maintenance of a favorable legal order." On a national level, busi-
({/ See generally Andrew 1. Buck et aI., Casinos, Crime, And Real Estate Values: Do They 
Relate?, 28 1. OF REsEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 288,301-02 (1991) [hereinafter Buck et aI.]; 
Simon Hakim and Andrew 1. Buck, Do Casinos Enhance Crime?, 17 1. CRIM. lUSTICE 409, 414-15 
(1989) [hereinafter Hakim]. 
011 
70 
See Buck et aI., supra note 67, at 301-02; Hakim, supra note 67, at 414-15. 
Buck et aI., supra note 67, at 289 . 
Id. 
7. Se" e.g., GOODMAN, supra note 3, and infra. 
12 Buck et aI., supra note 67, at 302. 
73 For explanations of this concept in the context of the McDougallLasswell decision-making 
model as applied to corporate development of national and international resources, see 
loHN W. KINDT, 1 MARINE PoLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 11-17 (1992); lohn W. Kindt, 
Prolegomenon To Marine Pollution And The Law Of The Sea, II ENvn.. L. 67, 70-72 (1980). 
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nesses want to know the "rules" under which they must operate. Commer-
cial entities understandably become concerned in a society or country 
where, for example, the tax code is constantly changing, is not inherently 
"uniform," and/or is not being uniformly applied (or is even manipulated 
by the government).74 Further, and as an extreme example, companies 
generally refuse to locate in countries undergoing revolution, or even 
threatened revolution. Regardless of any overwhelmingly positive conces-
sions a pre-existing government may make, without stability of expecta-
tions businesses fear that those concessions will never be realized. Accord-
ingly, a lack of stability of expectations can hamper or destroy any given 
business/economic environment by making calculation of risk difficult or 
impossible. 
Throughout the twentieth century, and particularly since World War II, 
the maintenance of a favorable legal order and inherent stability have been 
two major strengths of the United States which have induced foreign in-
vestment within the U.S. economy. Presumably, the United States enjoys a 
higher stability of expectations than any other country, and this stability is 
crucial to maintain this pillar of the U.S. business/economic environment. 
One of the unfortunate results of the U.S. savings-and-Ioan debacle of the 
1980s was to chip this economic pillar, particularly in the minds of many 
U.S. citizens.7s 
Nationwide, the individual states have obviously benefited from these 
overall U.S. economic strengths and have successfully solicited foreign 
and domestic businesses to locate within their borders. Some states, how-
ever, have hurt their initially competitive positions for attracting new busi-
nesses by creating certain unstable business/economic factors. During 
1991, for example, the states of California76 and Illinois" were unable to 
pay their state obligations (such as wages to state employees in lllinois) 
and engaged in delays and sleight-of-hand to pay their bills. In so doing, 
these state governments effectively undermined the stability of expecta-
tions in their states,78 decreasing the likelihood that businesses would 
.. See. e.g .• lohn W. Kindt, The New Assault On Freedom Of Thought: Section 263A Of The 
Internal Revenue Code. 33 ST. LoUIS U. LJ. 137 (1988). 
7S See. e.g .• Tom Schlesinger. A Taxpayers' Program For Cleaning Up The S&'L Mess. 
USA TODAY. September 1991. at 22. 
76 Steven V. Roberts et aI •• California Crumbling. U.S. Naws & WORLD REp .• September 14. 
1992. at 69. See also Michael Meyer. In A State O/Collapse. NawSWBBK. August 17. 1992. at 37. 
77 See Mary A. Laschober. The Link Between Current Tax Receipts And The Illinois Budget 
Crisis. ILL. Bus. REv .• Fall 1991. at 8. 9. 
71 See. e.g .• H. Campbell Stuckeman. Community Evaluation In Site Selection. in INDUSTRIAL 
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choose them as locations for new subsidiaries.79 Conversely, the bulk of 
states which did not have to delay payments enjoyed a relative advantage 
for attracting new businesses.80 However, any concessions, such as tax 
concessions, offered by California or TIlinois could more than offset the 
problem of "instability" of payments and thereby attract new businesses. 
Yet despite the potential concessions California and TIlinois may make to 
new industries, they still suffer a competitive disadvantage due the inci-
dence of past instability. In essence, California and TIlinois must now 
"pay" for the previous unstable business/economic conditions caused by 
their legislative budgeting anomalies. 
IV. BUSINESS LOCATION MODELS 
Indetennining where to invest their d,ollars by building new plants or 
establishing new subsidiaries, corporations with large asset bases generally 
tum to "business location models."8l Even small companies can utilize 
the less complex models,82 but the models utilized by the larger compa-
nies,83 such as the Fortune 500,84 tend to be quite sophisticated.8s Obvi-
ously, the major businesses like to keep these models confidential,86 be-
FACII..lTIES PLANNING 97, 99 (H. M. Conway and Linda L. Liston eds., 1976) [hereinafter Stuckeman]. 
" See notes l1JO..105, 'infra, and accompanying text 
10 Stuckeman, supra note 78, at 99 (the "state business climate"). "Are the state legislative, 
executive and judiciary branches performing as well as other state governments?" Id. This category 
constitutes one of the criteria in the site selection process for businesses. 
II For historical background and an introduction to business-related decision-making in gener-
al, see F'RmDRlCH ROSENKRANz, AN INTRODUcnON To CORPORATE MODELING (1979) [hereinafter 
ROSENKRANZ]. See generally, JON B. BROWNING, How To SELECT A BusINESS SITE (1980) [hereinaf-
ter BROWNING]; INDUSTRIAL FACll.ITIES PLANNING (H. M. Conway and Linda L. Liston eds., 1976) 
[hereinafter PLANNING]; WILLIAM N. KINNARD AND STEPHEN D. MESSNER, BFPIlcnVE BusINESS 
RBLocATION (1970) [hereinafter KINNARD]; ROOER w. SCHMENNER, MAKING BUSINESS LocATION 
DECISIONS (1982) [hereinafter SCHMBNNER]; DAVID M. SMmI, INDUSTRIAL LocATION (2d ed. 1981) 
[hereinafter SMmI]; JOHN S. THOMPSON, SITE SELECTION (1982) [hereinafter THOMPSON]; ALFRED 
WOOER, THEoRY OF THE LocATION OF INDUSTRIES (Carll. Friedrich trans., 1937) [hereinafter we-
BER]. 
a See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 81, at 167 (store location research for single stores); id. 
at 197 (simplified guide to store location research). 
13 For examples of the starting points for the business location models including the variable-
cost model and operational models, see generally SMrm, supra note 81, at 149-313. 
.. For general examples of business location analyses involving the Fortune 500, see 
SCHMBNNER, supra note 81, at 60 et seq. 
15 For a summary of various theories of business location within the framework of spatial eco-
nomic analysis, see SMmI, Supra note 81, at 68-107. See also WOOER, supra note 81. 
.. Businesses express a need for confidentiality in various aspects of the decision-making pro-
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cause the models can be the subject of large investments of time and 
money, and because competitors would gain some economic advantage 
from them. A classic example of a company utilizing sophisticated busi-
ness location models involves a major fast food chain, which is the leader 
in its area. Its competitors would obviously be quite interested in being 
able to predict ahead of time where and when that chain was going to 
establish new outlets and potentially locate there first. 
One nuance strategy for the smaller competitors in such a market situ-
ation is simply to let the industry leader claim the primary location sites 
and then to follow the leader to those sites when they become public. This 
location strategy bypasses many of the expenses in utilizing business loca-
tion models, but the escalating real estate costs which must be internalized 
by being the second, third, or fourth competitor into a prime market area 
may often be greater than the costs of utilizing the business location mod-
els. However, from an individual state's perspective, familiarity with busi-
ness location models will likely expand that state's opportunity for attract-
ing new businesses and even for retaining established businesses. B7 
When faced with the decision-making process of where to locate ini-
tially or where to expand its presence, a company should examine the tra-
ditional business location models.ss Some business models are used more 
than others, but many of the factors utilized therein are quite consistent 
with the economic variations that depend on the nature of the business.89 
Over time, the models often become quite sophisticated90 as they adapt to 
the specialized needs of the company which makes use of them. It should 
also be noted that given their complexities, these models can easily take 
on "minds of their own" and the number of variables these models address 
can yield unexpected conclusions.91 
cess involving businesses location issues. For example, a company may "send several teams at differ-
ent times to anonymously inspect each community." Stuckeman, supra note 79, at 97. 
17 For examples of business location infonnation of interest to state policymakcrs, see 
KINNARD, supra note 81, at 32-34 (public awareness and involvement); SMITIi, supra note 81, at 63 
(public policy, planning, and the state) and 359-92 (industrial location, development planning, and s0-
cial well-being). See generally BROWNING, supra note 81, at 31-48. 
.. For examples of starting points for formulating business location models, see notc 81, su-
pra, and accompanying text. 
.. See generally id. 
!III See, e.g., SMITIi, supra note 81, at 149 et seq. 
91 For an introduction to the historical business decision-making models in general and their 
complexities, see ROSENKRANZ, supra note 81. For a historical perspective on planning systems in the 
context of business decision-making, see JAMES B. BOULDEN, COMPUTER-AsSISTED PLANNING SYS-
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Most of the traditional business location models include a category 
which is generically termed the "business environment."92 A classic "red-
flag" component of this category is "high-crime rate. ,,93 For example, a 
business location computer model would, by definition, identify a generic 
type of red-flag to alert a company which was considering locating in a 
particular county if· that county had the highest violent crime rate or the 
highest illegal drug use in the state.94 Similarly, "legalized gambling ac-
tivities" become an important factor in a company's decision whether to 
locate in certain communities. !IS While the advantages of locating in a 
given area might still overwhelm the notable disadvantages associated with 
its red-flag drawbacks,96 that decision would have to be made as a type 
of managerial override of the red-flag alerts.'17 The point is that counties 
TBMS (1975). 
92 Perhaps ''the most important qualification of all" is "community attitude" as part of the 
business environment Stuckeman, supra note 78, at 99. ''Community" and ''Government Aspects" 
constitute "Major Factors That Shape Plant Location Searches." SCHMENNER, supm note 81, at 33. For 
examples of checklists involving the community business climate, see BROWNING, supm note 81, at 
108-11, 125-28. The origins of this consideration are apparently found in "social and cultural" location 
dynamics. See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 81, at 21-22. In current analyses, businesses are often encour-
aged to ''band-pick" their business community environments. See, e.g., BROWNING, supm note 81, at 
87-114. In a juxtaposition of issues in this area, some traditional business ventures, such as retail li-
quor stores, carry the image of imposing various sorts of "negative environmental impacts" on the 
community and these businesses must accommodate community concerns before entering a chosen 
community. See, e.g., KINNARD, supra note 81, at 60-62. 
III See, e.g., BROWNING, supm note 81, at 164 (checklist of "Police Aspects''); PLANNING, 
supra note 81, at 303-04 (civil disorders), 308 (crime); Stuckeman, supra note 78, at 99, For examples 
of analyses demonstrating the interface between crime and some business-economic issues in the area 
of legalized gambling, see Buck et aI., supra note 67, at 288; Hakim, supra note 67, at 409. Various 
impacts are incorporated under the general rubric of "crime." 
!N For an example of a practical application of crime (specifically, robbery) as factored into 
"quality of life" considerations iii business location decisions, see John M. Griffin and Norbert Dee, 
Measuring The Intangible: How To Quantify Quality Of Life, in PLANNING, supra note 81, at 219, 
220-21. 
" For examples of various ''pitfalls'' to be considered in business location models, see 
BROWNING, supm note 81, at 205-211. 
!16 Id. Historical trends provide support for these propositions. 
During the fust six years of the 19705, seventy-three (almost 15 percent) of the Fortune-500 
companies moved their headquarters. The most frequent reason stated was the decline of 
the cities. High crime rates, dirty streets, and the fact that increasing numbers of young ex-
ecutives offered a job at headquarters refused it have also contributed. 
Id. at 10. Business location models delimit a "[pJrimary concern for the quality of life in an area," 
SCHMENNBR, supra note 81, at 38 (emphasis in original). 
'" The final question for the business location decision maker is often: "If the company trans-
flm'ed me to this location, would I want to move my family here?" BROWNING, supra note 81, at 210. 
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and states with these red-flag components are at a definite competitive 
disadvantage for attracting new businesses to their economies. 
The question of whether high crime rates per se are associated with 
legalized gambling activities is beyond the scope of this discussion.98 In 
addition, any specific red-flag areas are or should be separate components 
in business location models. Even so, pre-existing legalized gambling 
activities in any county or state constitute a definite negative in efforts to 
attract new businesses (and in keeping pre-existing businesses).99 It is 
largely irrelevant whether the gambling activity has been legalized or not. 
The basic negative socio-economic impacts of an activity do not change 
just because an activity has been "legalized" - although the parameters of 
the negatives may be regulated or monitored more closely. 
In the public domain, the best analysis interfacing a community envi-
ronment with readily accessible legalized gambling activities is contained 
in The Impact of Casino Gambling In New Orleans loo by the Division of 
Business and Economic Research at the University of New Orleans. This 
report referenced a 1989 surveylOJ in which business leaders were asked 
what factors were "absolutely essential" in locating their businesses:102 
With respect to office locations, the business leaders listed eight 
factors that were important. Of these eight, two were related to the 
business climate: 1) the climate created by state and local govern-
ment for business, which was ranked fourth with 29 percent of the 
respondents saying it was essential and 2) the ability to attract 
executives and professional[s] from outside the area, which was 
9B See, e.g., Buck et aI., supra note 67, at 288; Hakim, supra note 67, at 409. 
For a summary of the socio-economic concerns associated with legalized gambling activities as 
they interface with the criminal justice system, see Frank Kelley, Michigan Attorney General, Address 
before the International Conference on Gambling, Nashville, Tenn. (February II, 1994) ("I have been 
Michigan's Attorney General for more than thirty years, and there has never been an issue that has 
disturbed me any more than the proliferation of gambling in our state.") [hereinafter Mich. AU'y 
Gen.]. 
.. As a general observation in a related issue area involving business location decisions, 
"[mJany business activities are regarded as 'unsuitable neighbors' both for residences and for other 
types of more 'desirable' business activity." KINNARD, supra note 81, at 61. 
1110 TIMOTHY P. RYAN, ET AL., THE IMPACT OF CASINO GAMBLING IN NEW ORLEANS (Divi-
sion of Business and Economic Research, University of New Orleans 1990) [hereinafter RYAN]. 
101 This survey was undertaken by the economic development fInD of Cushman and Wakefield, 
utilizing the polling firm of Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. 
102 RYAN, supra note 100, at 30. 
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ranked seventh with 22 percent of the respondents saying it was 
essential. This is consistent with other surveys that have been 
done. 103 
109 
It should also be noted that when these business leaders were polled about 
"other" cities, "[o]nly three percent felt that Las Vegas was an attractive 
place to locate a business today [1989]"104 and "only 2 percent respond-
ed that they felt Las Vegas would be attractive in the next five years."IOS 
An actual case example demonstrated several of these points when in 
March of 1992, Mayor Richard Daley announced and gave his support to 
a proposed $2-billion casino complex for Chicago. I06 Mayor Daley's 
plan was criticized as "increasing crime and other social problems and 
discouraging other businesses from locating [in Chicago]."I07 In this con-
text, Mayor Daley claimed that he had first tried to attract another Walt 
Disney World to the Chicago area/os but failing in that attempt he was 
hoping to establish a $2-billion casino complex. Despite the many vari-
ables associated with such decisions, the speed with which the Mayor 
appeared to dismiss the Disney-type possibility hurt the Mayor's credibili-
ty. It seemed unreasonable that an attractive offer could not have been 
negotiated to attract the Walt Disney Company or a similar company -
given the resources of the City of Chicago and the Governor of lllinois 
(whom Mayor Richard Daley did not consult prior to announcing the 
Chicago casino complex).I09 
Even so, it seemed illogical that a theme park the size of Walt Disney 
World would ever locate in the Chicago area once a $2-billion casino 
complex was approved. In other words, in business as in politics, the rule 
is that business persons should "never say never." However, in this hypo-
103 
11M 
"15 
106 
Ial 
Id. at 30-31. 
Id. at 32. 
Id. 
Walsh, supra note 25. at 3. 
Id. 
101 See generally. Chris Reidy. Gambling Has Become The Nice Vice. BOSTON GLOBE, Janu-
ary 17. 1993. at 69.71 (''The word gambling makes ... [employees of legalized gambling organiza-
tions] uncomfortable .... In an era when casinos are designed with water slides and Disney-style 
theme parks, ... [they prefer] such terms as 'gaming' and 'family entertainment'."). 
100 John Kass and Rick Pearson. Daley Folds Casino Hand. CHI. nUB •• January B. 1993. § I. 
at I, lB. "[Mayor] Daley had sought the legislature's approval of the casino project last year without 
rust discussing the idea with [Governor] Edgar, who is opposed to casino gambling in the city." 1d. 
at I. 
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thetical instance, the business location models and/or decision-making pro-
cess for a Disney-size theme park would probably have "red-flags" all 
over the "business environment" category, as well as many other catego-
ries. Of course this discussion is limited to only the impacts of legalized 
gambling activities, while many other factors in the business location 
models (such as the climate in Chicago) could have been of crucial impor-
tance. 
In other hypothetical discussions, a related, interesting scenario could 
also occur. After the Walt Disney Company publicly announced plans in 
1993 to establish a theme park in the area of Manassas, Virginia. a pro-
posal for a legalized gambling riverboat complex was aggressively pro-
moted for Richmond, Virginia - only ninety-four miles away.1I0 Since 
tourism is the second leading industry in Virginia, it is interesting to con-
sider whether a "pre-existing" legalized gambling complex in Richmond or 
in Washington, D.C. (only thirty-seven miles distant from Manassas) 
would have negated the decision of the Walt Disney Company. Perhaps 
the projected drawdown on the visitors to the Disney theme park would 
have been minimal given the distances involved. Perhaps other consider-
ations of locale would have been more important to Disney than the socio-
economic negatives associated with concentrated legalized gambling activ-
ities. Perhaps pre-existing legalized gambling complexes in Virginia would 
have caused Disney to reconsider Chicago. Regardless of these consider-
ations and many other variables which may have been vital, the fact re~ 
mains that Disney chose to locate first in a state with little or no legalized 
gambling activities.11l 
110 For an outline of the proposal to bring legalized riverboat gambling to Virginia. see 
ert W. Cook, Economic And Fiscal Impact Of Riverboat Gaming In Virginia (November 1993) 
pared for the Virginia Riverboat Council, calculating that seven riverboats would create $123 
in tax revenues, 7,000 direct jobs, and 17,000 indirect jobs). For a critique of this 
Wayne K. Talley, An ATUllysis Of Economic And Fiscal Impact Of Riverboat Gaming In 
(February 1994) (prepared for the Assembly Group, concluding that seven riverboats would create 
$10 million in tax revenues and 2,766 net jobs) (available from Prof. Wayne K. Talley, Old 
University, Norfolk, Va.). The large differences in these numbers indicate the typical parameters 
economic debate. Professor Talley's analysis was significantly more realistic and highlighted the 
lem of double counting which apparently occurred in the earlier analysis. 
III In any event, Virginia had considerably less legalized gambling activities than 
which already had nine or ten riverboats, as well as off-track betting parlors in 1993. 
however, have the lottery, which was initiated in 1988. CLOTFELTER, supra note 7, at 156-58 
endum passed November 4, 1987). Presumably, the initial business location investigation 
begun years before Disney's public announcement in 1993. 
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In this context, it is interesting to note that the 85-member Greater 
Washington (D.C.) Board of Trade quickly and unanimously rejected a 
1993 proposal to bring casino gambling to the area.1I2 There was appar-
ently very little debate among businesses and the tourist trade in Washing-
ton, D.C. - compared with the debate in Chicago which began in 1992 
and continued into 1994. The press report on the decision of the business 
leaders in the Washington, D.C. area was revealing. 
The Washington area's most influential business group ... de-
nounced Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly's efforts to bring casino gam-
bling to the District, attacking the idea as a poor use of city re-
sources. 
In a rare public stand on a controversial political issue, the 
Greater Washington Board of Trade's 85-member board voted 
unanimously against the initiative. 
The group, which includes many of the Washington area's 
most powerful business leaders, could have provided strong back-
ing for Kelly's plans to use gambling to spur economic develop-
ment. The mayor has courted the group on various financial is-
sues. 
''The addition of casino gambling would not enhance the city's 
image," the Board of Trade said in a statement .... "Directors 
believe that the city should concentrate on key economic develop-
ment initiatives such as the convention center redevelopment, 
neighborhood revitalization and an aggressive business retention 
program," adding that gaming is "diverting the Kelly 
administration's attention away from well-outlined priorities.,,1\3 
This decision by the Board of Trade was a significant reflection of busi-
ness acumen and it unanimously rejected the standard claims of economic 
development promulgated by the legalized gambling interests. 114 
In any event, it should be emphasized that there are also fundamental 
differences in substantial portions of the tourist and nontourist clienteles 
attracted by complexes dedicated to gambling, as distinguished from other 
112 Liz Spayd and Yolanda Woodlee. Trade Board Rejects D.C. Casino Plan. WASH. POST. 
September 25. 1993. § A. at 1 [hereinafter Spayd]. 
III Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
114 Id at 1, 8. 
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types of tourist attractions. These differences are important, despite the 
efforts of many legalized gambling facilities to disguise themselves as 
"family entertainment centers." "But a casino is not an adult Disney-
land,"1IS according to law professor I. Nelson Rose, who summarized 
some of the issues differentiating a casino from a bona fide family enter-
tainment center. 
Disneyland would not exploit minors, or drunks, or compUlsives 
[i.e., compUlsive gamblers], even if it could get away with it. But 
some casinos do it every day and then lie about it, even to them-
selves. 116 
Considerable weight should be given to the argument that in many re-
spects a Disney-style theme park and a legalized gambling complex are 
not just different, but fundamentally incompatible. These problems lead to 
the proposition that each state, particularly tourist-oriented states, must 
decide on their "tourist environment" as well as their statewide "business 
and community environments." Given some of Buro Disney's marketing 
problems during the early 1990s,117 it would be difficult to believe that a 
Manassas theme park would not have some serious concerns about proxi-
mate legalized gambling facilities -particularly riverboats and casinos. 
The main point is that counties, cities, and states must choose their 
respective business environments. Chicago needs to determine whether it 
wants to be known as "the City that Works" or "the City that Gam-
bles.,,118 Likewise, TIlinois needs to determine if it wants to be known as 
"the State that Works" or "the State that Gambles." Virginia, Florida, and 
other tourist-oriented states will also need to decide on their "tourist envi-
ronment.,,119 As the Greater Washington Board of Trade emphasized, 
"[t]he addition of casino gambling would not enhance the city's im-
11. I. Nelson Rose, The Rise And Fall Of The Third Wave: Gambling Will Be Outlawed In 
Forty Years, at 65, 72, in GAMBLING AND PuBLIC PoLICY: INTERNATIONAL I'ERSPECrIvES (William R. 
Eadington and Judy A. Cornelius eds. 1991) (emphasis in original). 
116 Id. at 72. 
m See, e.g., Euro Disney's Wish Comes True, THE EcoNOMIST, March 19, 1994, at 83; Melt-
down At The Cilitural Chemobyl, THE EcONOMIST, February 5, 1994, at 65. 
118 Walsh. supra note 25, at 3 (''The dispute also has an emotional edge dealing with self-im-
age .... 'If we become the gambling center of the Midwest: [Chicago Aldel'llllln Lawrence] Bloom 
said, 'that's what we're going to be known as, and that's not what Chicago is .... ). 
II' See Spayd, supra note 112, at 1. 
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age," 120 or as Michigan Attorney General Frank Kelley concluded 
"[ c ]ities tryi~g to create a better image should stay away from gam-
bling.,,121 Before the twenty-fIrst century, all U.S. counties, cities, and 
states will be faced with similar issues involving their community and 
business environments. 
v. WHY BUSINESSES SHOULD NOT LOCATE IN LEGALIZED 
GAMBLING STATES AND WHY THEY SHOULD CONSIDER 
RELOCATING IF THEY CAN 
A. The Business Environment in Gambling States as Inherently De-
structive 
Sound economic reasons dictate that businesses should avoid locating 
in counties and states with legalized gambling activities if they can locate 
elsewhere. l22 Obviously, if the same degrees of legalized gambling pre-
exist in all potential locations, the gambling activities component and re-
lated considerations may be largely irrelevant. However, those areas with-
out legalized gambling activities have a competitive business-economic 
advantage over those states which have legalized gambling. 
The best policy for most states is to establish themselves as "gam-
bling-free" states. Gambling-free states escape the vast majority of socio-
economic problems which encumber the local economies and governments 
of states with legalized gambling. States recently succumbing to pressures 
to enact state lotteries (such as Georgia in November of 1992) would be 
well-advised to disassociate their economies from legalized gambling ac-
tivities and return to their previous status as gambling-free states. The lon-
ger the legalized gambling philosophy is allowed to influence an economy, 
the harder it becomes to revert to a gambling-free economy. However, 
economic history also demonstrates that gambling activities are generally 
recriminalized after an eventual erosion, and implosion, of the economy 
originally embracing them.123 
A major reason that businesses do not want to be located in gambling 
states is because legalized gambling elevates social-welfare pressures on 
120 
121 
122 
123 
Id. 
Mich. Alt'y Gen., supra note 98, at 4. 
See, e.g., Buck et aI., supra note 67, at 301-02; Hakim, supra note 67, at 414-15. 
See Rose, supra note lIS, at 74. 
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local and state governments to raise corporate, personal, and real estate 
taxes. Companies are naturally averse to paying higher corporate and real 
estate taxes to address these increasing problems. Business employees dis-
like higher personal and real estate taxes for the same reasons. Nor do 
businesses want to tack a salary bonus on their employees' paychecks to 
cover the increased taxes concomitant to living in a "high-tax state." The 
term "high-tax state" is a term which in the future will become more syn-
onymous with "gambling state."124 For example, in 1992 Money maga-
zine found Sioux Falls, South Dakota a prime community in which to 
live. l2S Interestingly, there were no personal income taxes in South Da-
kota. Naturally, potential employees want to live and work in such envi-
ronments. Since 1988, however, with the initiation and subsequent rapid 
proliferation of legalized gambling activities in South Dakota, an eventual 
state income tax is likely, and such activities may cause Sioux Falls to 
lose its favorable community business environment. l26 By comparison, in 
1988 Money magazine designated Atlantic City, New Jersey as the least 
livable U.S. community.127 
Of course, it is possible for a smaller gambling economy to live para-
sitically off of a larger non-gambling economy - Nevada and California, 
respectively - so long as the non-gambling economy cooperates.128 It is 
well-documented that there is "a direct transfer of income and wealth from 
California to Nevada every year.,,129 Gambling by Californians pumps 
nearly $3.8 billion per year into Nevada,l30 which translates into over 
one percent of California's Gross State Product. l3l In such an instance, it 
is therefore possible for a gambling state, such as Nevada, to be a low-tax 
124 An exception, however, is a small state, such as Nevada, living parasitically off of a larger 
state, such as California. SUBSIDY, supra note II, at ES-I; CALIFORNIA GoVERNOR'S OFFICE OF 
PLANNING AND RHsHARCH, Office Of Planning And Research Releases Study Of The Economic Rela-
tionship Between California And Nevada As It Relates To Legalized Gambling, December 17, 1992, at 
1-2 [hereinafter Cal. Research]. 
135 Marguerite T. Smith and Debra Wishik Englander, The Best Places To Live In America, 
MONEY, September 1992, at 110. 
126 See also John W. Kindt, Address before the South Dakota Citizens Forum on Video-Lottery 
Terminals, Sioux Falls, S.D. (October 18, 1992). 
117 Richard Eisenberg and Debra Wishik Englander, The Best Places To Live In America, 
MONEY, August 1988, at 83. 
IZII SUBSIDY, supra note II, at ES-1, ES-4. 
1%9 Id. at ES-I; Cal. Research, supra note 124, at 1. 
130 SUBSIDY, supra note II, at ES-I; Cal. Research, supra note 124, at 1. 
III SUBSIDY, supra note 11, at ES-1. 
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state with no business or personal income tax.132 Yet the previous points 
involving the economic advantages inherent in non-gambling states retain 
their validity, because until recently, the Nevada/California scenario was 
generally an exception. Furthermore, these principles can obviously be 
reflected across state lines in a more regional phenomenon; that is, compa-
nies will be less likely to locate in general "regions" of the country where 
the harder forms of gambling are legalized. 
The business environment is poor for business operations in gambling 
areas - except for legalized gambling organizations and their cluster ser-
vices. For years, Nevada has had several communities with sufficient in-
frastructure to support numerous light industries, and yet those industries 
have chosen to locate elsewhere. There is no Silicon Valley or its equiva-
lent in Nevada, and one major reason is that a substantial majority of pre-
existing and potential employees do not want to work or raise families in 
a Nevada-like gambling environment 
Although the major Nevada communities competed vigorously 
throughout the 1980s to attract new businesses unrelated to legalized gam-
bling and its cluster services, these negative factors have created an image 
which is not conducive to attracting new industries. Despite low taxes and 
a cheap pool of labor, most major companies have decided against locat-
ing in Nevada. One major company which was persuaded to locate in the 
Las Vegas area even changed its mailing address away from Las Vegas, 
allegedly to protect its company's image. 
In any event, the "community environment" and its concomitant "busi-
ness environment" appear to be the most important considerations re-
viewed by the Fortune 500 companies and other large businesses when 
considering where to locate. As Nevada illustrates, these considerations 
also appear to outweigh significantly the considerations pertaining to the 
availability of infrastructure, the demographics of the labor pool, and even 
tax rates. 
Id.; Cal. Research, supra note 124. at 1. 
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B. Increased Personnel Costs for Businesses Located in Gambling 
States 
Businesses can also expect major personnel problems if they choose to 
locate in a state with legalized gambling. Similarly, businesses will experi-
ence a premium in personnel costs if they allow the state in which they 
are presently located to legalize gambling. In this context, it is helpful to 
delineate strategic socio-economic factors which contribute to these in-
creased personnel costs for businesses. 
In a state with no legalized gambling, the population will contain ap-
proximately .77 percent compulsive gamblers and 2.33 percent "potential" 
compulsive gamblers.133 The associated socio-economic costs are usually 
not readily apparent because they have already been subsumed into the 
pre-existing economy measured over decades. Once gambling activities are 
legalized and become socially "acceptable," however, the number of com-
pulsive gamblers quickly increases to between 1.5 to 5 percent of the 
workforce. l34 To illustrate this point, if a business has 1,000 employees, 
the number of compulsive gamblers would increase from approximately 
eight to between fifteen and fifty employees. Furthermore, the "problem" 
economic gamblers (which includes the compulsive gamblers above) 
would total ten percent of the workforce, or 100 employees. l35 It is inter-
esting to note that this ten percent parallels, and indeed corroborates, the 
reported clinical case load of problem gamblers in South Dakota, a state 
which only recently introduced casino gambling and VLTs at the end of 
1989.136 
As a direct result, then, businesses can anticipate increases of 100 to 
III See generally u.s. COMMISSION ON THE REvmw OF THE NATIONAL PoUCY TOWARD 
GAMBUNG. GAMBUNG IN AMERICA 73 (1976) [hereinafter U.S. COMMISSION ON GAMBUNG}. 
134 See Rachel A. Volberg. Estimating The Prevalence Of Pathological Gambling In The Unit-
ed States. in GAMBUNG BEHAVIOR AND PROBLBM GAMBUNG CW. R. Eadington ed. 1992); Rachel A. 
Volberg And Henry 1. Steadman. Prevalence Estimates Of Pathological Gambling In New Jersey And 
Maryland. 146 AM. 1. PsYCHIATRY 1618 (1989); Rachel A. Volberg And Henry J. Steadman, Refining 
Prevalence Estimates Of Pathological Gambling. 145 AM. 1. PSYCHIATRY 502 (1988); ALBERTA LoT-
TERIES AND GAMING. GAMBLING AND PROBLEM GAMBUNG IN ALBERTA 18 (1anuary 1994) (summa-
rizing twenty studies showing prevalence rates of problem and pathological gambling among the adult 
population of several states). 
13. See CLoTFBLTBR. supra note 7. at 92-94. 
1]6 S.D. Bankruptcies. supra note 29. at 1 (''Ten percent of the clients who ... went to the 
Consumer Credit Counseling Services of Lutheran Social Services of Sioux Falls openly admit [ted) 
that gambling underlies their financial problems . . . :'). 
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550 percent in problems resulting from compulsive gamblers. Nationwide, 
an entirely new addicted workforce is being created as a result of legaliz-
ing gambling. In addition to the family and financial problems associated 
with compulsive gamblers which drain the resources of the local commu-
nity, the state, and society at large, problems also directly and indirectly 
manifest themselves in the workforce. The internal problems which busi-
nesses can anticipate include increasing absenteeism and declining produc-
tivity. The average lost productivity for each compulsive gambler (at 1.5 
to 5 percent of the workforce) has been calculated to be at least $15,000 
per year,137 but may be as high as $23,000 to $27,000.138 To this total 
should be added the lost productivity of problem economic gamblers 
which, although not yet calculated within a range of specific dollar 
amounts, involves an added 5 to 8.5 percent of the workforce. Further-
more, the vast majority of those identified as compulsive gamblers often 
resort to theft from the workplace to finance their gambling.l39 Given 
this information, one observer has commented that "from a purely finan-
cial point of view, compulsive gambling is potentially worse [for an em-
ployer] than alcoholism and drug abuse combined."I40 In sum, personnel 
problems involving the dismissal of employees will presumably increase, 
and new legal grounds for dismissal may complicate the existing laws 
involving management-personnel relations. 141 
Furthermore, businesses are already facing increasing personnel prob-
lems, specifically rehabilitation costs, from employees engaging in illegal 
drug use and alcohol abuse, both "addictions" according to the American 
Psychiatric Association (AP A). Several major companies have internalized 
the costs of treating their addicted employees for substance abuse, specifi-
cally alcohol and drugs. Added to these costs will be the costs of treating 
another AP A-recognized addiction, gambling addiction. 142 Sociologists 
"7 MARYLAND REPoRT, supra note 14, at 59; see id. at 59-61. 
"" ROBERT M. PoLlTZBR BT AL., REPORT ON THE SOCIETAL COST OF PATIIOLOGICAL GAM-
BLING AND THE COST-BENEFIT EFFIlcTIvENESS OF TREATMENT 9 (1981) [hereinafter PoLITZER ET 
AL); BE'ITER GoV'T ASS'N REPoRT, supra note I, at 14. 
139 Gerry T. Fulcher, The Dark Side Of A Trip To The Track, INDus. WK., August 5, 1991, 
at 13 ("85% of the thousands of identified compulsive gamblers admit to stealing from their employ-
ers. given the opportunity"). 
,.. Id. 
,., Perhaps the most interesting connection is that Type-A personalities - the very best blue-
collar workers, the most productive white-collar workers, and the aggressive entrepreneurial managers 
- all fall within psychological profiles most susceptible to becoming problem gamblers. See MARY-
LAND REPORT, supra note 14, at 20-34. 
,., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MEN-
118 BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 
readily recognize the parallels between these three addictions. If conserva-
tive estimates of treating each gambling addict are utilized and absorbed 
by companies, the rehabilitative costs per employee can easily range from 
$15,000143 to $42,000:44 
Therefore, in a hypothetical company with 1,000 employees, the num-
ber of gambling addicts will be .77 percent, or seven to eight employees, 
before gambling is legalized.14s This nominal sum often goes unnoticed 
and/or unaddressed by employers. Once gambling becomes legalized, 
however, a new addicted population will rise to include 1.5 to 5 percent of 
the workforce, and fifteen to fifty addicted employees can be anticipated. 
This 100 to 550 percent mcrease will transform a largely hidden problem 
into a significant and costly personnel quandary. Responsible firms that 
provide addiction treatment will face a conservative rehabilitative cost of 
$20,000 per gambling-addicted employee. l46 Increased personnel costs to 
a company with 1,000 employees would then amount to between $140,000 
and $840,000. Add to this a lost productivity cost of $15,000 to $27,000 
per employee,147 and business could incur $35,000 in costs per gambling 
employee, for a total cost of $245,000 to $1.5 million. 
It is unrealistic to think that state governments will directly shoulder 
these costs. State governments, traditionally pressured by taxpayers, place 
at least part of these rehabilitative and quality-of-life costs onto the busi-
nesses themselves. Businesses, then, will bear a substantial internal cost 
burden generated by the problems associated with compulsive gambling. 
Furthermore, a definite ten percent of our hypothetical workforce of 1,000 
employees, or 100 people, will become problem economic gamblers, i.e., 
employees who are on their way to becoming compulsive gamblers, as 
well as those already compulsive gamblers. 
Counties, cities, and states with legalized gambling activities are and 
will continue to become more competitively disadvantaged when trying to 
TAL DISORDERS § 312.31 (rev. 3d ed. 1987). 
'43 Some estimates are as low as $5,000 to $10,000 for out-patients, but $20,000 is a more rea-
sonable number. BB1TI!R GoV'T Ass'N REPoRT, supra note 1, at 12. 
,.. In-patient care for compulsive gamblers ranges from $17,000 to $20,000 per month at the 
Compulsive Gambling Center, Inc., in Baltimore, Maryland, to between $15,000 and $42,000 per 
month at other facilities, such as the Philadelphia Psychiatric Hospital. Interview with Dr. Valerie C. 
Lorenz, Executive Director, Compulsive Gambling Center, Inc., Baltimore, Md. (November 10; 1992). 
'45 U.S. COMMISSION ON GAMBLING, supra note 133, at 73. 
,.. See notes 143 and 144, supra, and accompanying texL 
'41 See PoLl1'Zl!R BT AL., supra note 138, at 9. 
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attract new businesses. In 1990, for example, Champaign County, lllinois, 
tried and failed to attract a $l-billion United Airlines facility. In 1992, the 
same county tried to attract a Spiegel distribution center promising 2,000 
jobs, but failed. Interestingly, Champaign City was in the midst of a well-
publicized legalized gambling controversy over off-track betting during 
this time. Both companies ultimately located in states with much less le-
galized gambling. 148 
These companies were probably utilizing business location models. 
Given the inherent nature of such models, the Champaign community, by 
embracing the gambling philosophy, was at a competitive disadvantage to 
non-gambling communities. Throughout 1990-1991,. there were well over 
150 media reports on the gambling controversy in the newspapers, radio 
reports, and television reports.149 It would be difficult to suggest that this 
'41 United Airlines settled in Indiana, and Spiegel located in Ohio. These companies undoubt-
edly utilized many factors in determining where to locate, and the Champaign gambling controversies 
may have been minor. For public relations reasons, however. no company would give precise reasons 
for choosing one community over another, and upper management might not have even realized the 
full extent of the direct and indirect gambling "red-flags" which are inherent in most business location 
models and which may have been reflected in their specialized models. Concessions promised by the 
other sites might also have been the determining factors. 
'019 Public concerns involving alleged misinformation by the legalized gambling interests, as 
sometimes abetted by the media, was exemplified by the following letter, which is reprinted in toto: 
To the editor: 
On June 30. [1990] the Ministers Alliance, representing eight black congregations, 
came out against off-track betting facilities [OTBs] in the Champaign area. 
The people of Champaign should ask themselves why most of the news organizations 
chose not to report or to downplay this obviously newsworthy story. 
While WICD television reported this event on June 30 (and while WCIA did not). 
The News-Gazette has never mentioned this fact although The News-Gazette published sto-
ries on off-track betting on July 2, 4, 5, 6 (two articles) and July 7 (an article plus the 
"Week in Quotes"). 
Obviously, several opportunities to report or mention this development in the black 
community were ignored. Perhaps this should not be a surprise, since The News-Gazette's 
lack of objectivity and blatant favoritism encouraging a betting parlor for Champaign was 
apparent in most of these articles - but particularly in a full front-page article, with a color 
photograph, in the June 24 edition of the paper. 
The public would prefer objective news. instead of editorial opinion and Mayor 
Dannel McCollum's propaganda disguised as news. 
Letter to the Editor from Diane E. Pierce, NEWS-GAZE1TE (Champaign, lll.), July 27, 1990, § A, at 4. 
The public opposition to the OTBs was apparently extensive and vigorous. See. e.g., Letter to the 
Editor from J. E. Miller, NEWS-GAZETI'E (Champaign, III.), July 13, 1990, § A, at 4 (indicating oppo-
sition to the OTBs from "at least 15 organizations',); Letter to the Editor from Connie Morenz, NEWS-
GAZETI'E (Champaign, 111.), July 23. 1990. § A, at 4 (indicating opposition to the OTBs ''from over 
two dozen civic and religious organizations" plus "eight ministers in the Ministers Alliance, represent-
120 BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 
major community issue was not factored into the decision-making process 
by both companies as they investigated the Champaign County region. 
Regardless of these determinations, legalized gambling communities 
and gambling states are in the process of developing poor community and 
business environments. The extent of negative consequences these commu-
nities face, however, is not always apparent, since companies rarely report 
their choices for location in a particular community based on its current or 
predicted deteriorating community environment. This is necessarily prob-
lematic for legalized gambling states which generate such deteriorating 
community environments. The economic trend is obvious; legalized gam-
bling states will continue to hurt their economies as they embrace the 
gambling interests and the gambling philosophy. Savvy businesses should 
not, and probably will not, locate in legalized gambling states. Moreover, 
businesses should not expand their employee base in a gambling state, but 
should attempt to relocate as many jobs as possible to non-gambling 
ing the black community''); Letter to the Editor from Rev. Don Ehlers, NEWS-GAZE1TE (Champaign, 
Ill.), July 24, 1990, § A, at 4 (indicating "[a] sizeable number of individuals from the community, 
especially from west Champaign, did oppose the location of an OTB in the city"). 
The OTB company's application fllSt received general press exposure on May 30, 1990, but the 
application to the Illinois Racing Board was scheduled for action on June 12, 1990. Potential oppo-
nents had only eight working days to voice their opposition and had to travel over 130 miles to the 
hearing. See J. Philip Bloomer, N/USery School Location Could Keep Betting Parlor Out, NEWS-GA-
ZE'ITB (Champaign, ll1.), June 9, 1990, § A, at I, 12 [hereinafter School Location]; Letter to the Editor 
from Philip Miller, NBWS-GAZE'ITB (Champaign, Ill.), June 16, 1990, § A, at 4 (complaining about the 
"fast-track" procedures). Under the lllinois Open Meetings Act, all meetings of public bodies are re-
quired to "be held at specific times and places which are convenient to the public." ILL. Rav. STAT. 
ch. 102, '142.01. As per this statute, or perhaps because of the public outcry, the Board's meeting was 
postponed. See School Location, supra, at 1. See generally Kathleen Cardella, Paperwork, Short Notice 
Help Stifle OTB Opposition, NBWS-GAZE'ITB (Champaign, Ill.), October 10, 1991, § B, at 3 [hereinaf-
ter Cardella]. These "political actions have stifled public access to pertinent information regarding the 
license application decisions that the public is entitled to know." Cardella, supra, at 3. 
Along with these alarming changes, the Champaign and Danville off-track betting scenarios 
have highlighted the swift speed with which the lllinois Racing Board can approve an off-
track betting license application. It requires no action on the part of local government and 
possibly can be approved without public support. 
Both the Champaign and Danville application processes underscore the short time 
frame that the public has to learn about this complex political issue and voice its concerns. 
It also demonstrates that public input is not always considered when approving off-track 
betting parlors. 
Unless there are changes in state law, other communities will be forced to act quickly 
to prevent the establishment of off-track betting parlors in their community. 
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states. 
VI. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE GAMBLING-FREE STATE 
FOR RETAINING PRE-EXISTING BUSINESSES AND 
ATTRACTING NEW BUSINESSES 
Those states which do not have any form of legalized gambling, in-
cluding a state lottery, should not legalize gambling activities for purely 
fiscal reasons alone. From a business/economic perspective, the best strate-
gy for a state is to declare itself a "gambling-free state" and then widely 
advertise itself as such. States which have already legalized gambling 
should re-criminalize gambling activities to boost their local economies. 
One major reason is that since most states are becoming infatuated with 
the gambling philosophy, those states without legalized gambling or with 
minimal legalized gambling will have several relative socio-economic ad-
vantages contributing to a positive business/economic environment. Even 
minimal legalized gambling in a state should be eliminated: once the 
Pandora's box of legalized gambling is opened, the socio-economic prob-
lems rapidly become ingrained in the economic fabric of the state . 
Within the near future, businesses will start looking for gambling-free 
states or economies to which they can escape. Sooner or later, businesses 
will become disenchanted with the socia-economic problems and relatively 
high taxes of gambling states. Gambling-free states or states with less 
gambling will have advantages in attracting new businesses and in retain-
ing pre-existing businesses. Strategically speaking, non-gambling states (or 
minimal-gambling states) will have more vibrant local economies, propor-
tionately more consumer dollars, better sociological environments, more 
productive jobs, and lower taxes. As of 1992, Utah and Hawaii were the 
only remaining states without any legalized gambling activities whatsoever 
- although many states still had very limited legalized gambling activi-
ties. Given Hawaii's reliance on a tourist economy, the citizenry of Hawaii 
probably realized that any legalized gambling activities would severely 
injure the pre-existing tourist economy. Furthermore, Utah was recogniz-
ing and promoting its gambling-free status as an economic plus, and Utah 
Governor Mike Leavitt emphasized this advantage: 
We're the number one job creation state in the country. We're 
number two in personal income growth .... And there are a lot 
of people, frankly, that would like to move to a state where there 
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is no gaming, where in fact you can have a safe place, a clean 
1 1· 150 P ace to lve .... 
As other states expand legalized gambling activities, the gambling-free 
states and those states which minimize gambling activities will increase 
their competitive advantage in attracting and retaining nongambling-related 
businesses. 
Similarly, many businesspersons instinctively recognize many of these 
economic principles. When a land-based casino was projected in New Or-
leans, local entrepreneurs, including the New Orleans Business Council, 
actively opposed the casino and the guaranteed effect of legalized gam-
bling facilities on pre-existing consumer dollars and tourist dollars. They 
feared that a casino would take customers from the native merchants and 
restauranteurs. Moreover, they failed to see how the Crescent City could 
benefit by dividing the substantial, existing tourist trade amongst itself. 
Not surprisingly, many New Orleanians were outraged that a proposed 
referendum on the casino issue was disallowed. 151 
In future years, businesses will invariably be attracted to non-gambling 
states, or to those states with less gambling, and their healthier economies 
with more consumer dollars, better business environments, and lower 
socio-economic problems. On a relative basis, the consumer dollars in 
non-gambling states will be less likely to be syphoned into the legalized 
gambling organizations, which are highly competitive in capturing local 
"consumer dollars" and transforming them into "gambling dollars."ls2 
Excepting the instances where a small gambling state lives parasitically off 
of the economy of a non-gambling state,IS3 the corporate, personal, and 
real estate taxes should be proportionately lower for gambling-free states 
and states with minimal gambling. In sum, the less there is of legalized 
gambling, the more vibrant the economy will be. 
In the long-term, gambling-free states will also have proportionately 
more economic strength than gambling states. For example, Georgia 
should immediately revoke its state lottery, because as one of the last non-
,so This Week with David Brinkley. (ABC television broadcast, March 20. 1994) (statement of 
Utah Governor Mike Leavitt). 
", Koselka, supra note 45. at 63. 
"2 See generally GooDMAN. supra note 3. See also William R. Eadington. Economic Percep-
tions Of Gambling Behavior. 3 J. GAMBLING BBHAv. 264 (1987). 
'53 See notes 128-132. supra. and accompanying text. 
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gambling states, its economy would prosper in comparison with its sister 
states. The local economies of gambling-free states will always have ad-
vantages in warding off recessionary economic trends. By comparison, 
these economic advantages will be unavailable to the gambling states, and 
since gambling economies have inherent recessionary trends, future reces-
sions could be proportionately more severe in gambling states. 
The legalized gambling interests frequently urge states to enact state 
lotteries or other forms of legalized gambling, claiming that gambling dol-
lars are being lost to other states or communities. However, this argument 
that "everybody is doing it" is patently deceptive and inherently invalid as 
an argument for anything. Similarly invalid is the argument by legalized 
gambling proponents that gambling should be legalized because "it's 
fun."I54 An associated argument of legalized gambling proponents is that 
while there may be some more crime and some socio-economic negatives, 
gambling is going to be legalized so people simply ought to accept it and 
enjoy it. In other words, the state is going to get assaulted economically, 
so the state might as well accept it. Obviously, there are regional draws 
that cross state lines, but what the legalized gambling proponents ultimate-
ly fail to mention is that while gambling dollars may be "lost" to other 
states, so are many of the socio-economic negatives. ISS 
When policymakers can avoid myopic fixation on the initial economic 
flash which the influx of dollars would create in any localized scenario, it 
readily becomes apparent that legalized gambling activities almost invari-
ably raise taxes, cost jobs, and create large socio-economic problems. 
Across the spectrum of pre-existing nongambling businesses, there must 
necessarily be a growing awareness of the difficulties of competing for 
those consumer dollars being transformed into gambling dollars 1S6 when 
legalized gambling activities enter a state and its communities. In the 
1>4 See, e.g., Illinois Journal (WCIA-Channel 3 [Champaign-Springfield, 111.] television broad-
cast, June 6 and 7, 1992) (interview with John Giovenco, President of the Gaming Division for Hilton 
Hotels Corp.). This argument is seductive because it suggests that public opinion is on the side of le-
galized gambling, when in fact it is rarely so when valid economic arguments are presented in a timely 
manner. 
"5 The rare exception to this scenario is exemplified by Las Vegas whose large tourist base 
means that the socio-economic problems associated with compulsive gambling are largely "exported" 
when the tourists return to their home states. The general rule is that states which legalize gambling 
and make it convenient to gamble are creating and retaining socio-economic negatives. These factors 
are widely recognized as the "acceptability factor" and the "accessibility factor." 
156 See note 152, supra, and accompanying text. 
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long-tenn, gambling-free states should experience proportionately less per-
sonal and business bankruptcies, stronger financial institutions, more vi-
brant business economies, and better tourist, business, and community en-
vironments. All of these fundamentals translate into solid advantages for 
gambling-free states to attract and retain businesses unassociated with le-
galized gambling activities. In all, one thing remains certain: before the 
end of this century, all states and many countries will be faced with estab-
lishing and maintaining the parameters of their strategic business and eco-
nomic environments. 
